In my post I described how Democrats in Washington were going to try to use the Summit to push Health Care Reform the extra few inches it needs to get passed. Thus, the audience for the Summit was not the public as much as it was the Congressional Democrats who needed to be persuaded to fight for this legislation, and who needed to be persuaded that Republicans had no real ideas that would turn into votes.

The hope is that this summit will give Democrats enough political breathing room (read: spine) to force the House of Representatives to pass the Senate version of HCR and the Senate to fix some problems with their bill through reconciliation. If that happens, Obama will have his victory. As Sullivan would say, “meep, meep“.

(Whoa, I just quoted myself. A blog first. How meta!)

While we have yet to see if the Summit will be seen as a galvanizing force behind a reform bill being signed by Obama, as the bill has not passed (yet?), it seems to have done exactly what I thought it would do, and the President did just about exactly what I thought he would do. As Politico’s Glenn Thrush noted, the President was “Lots of Spock, mixed with flashes of Kirk”.

At times, he’s been an impressively dispassionate moderator and observer, repeatedly offering to consider Republicans arguments with a professorial “that’s philosophically valid point” before picking them apart.

By the end of an admittedly grueling 7 hour event, I couldn’t help but think that the President succeeded in showing the Republican’s lack of ideas as a collective. Individual Republicans, like Wisconsin’s Paul Ryan, showed genuine understanding of the health care debate. As a whole, however, the Republicans stuck to their talking points of “scrap the current bill” and “start over” (which is code for “kill the bill”), which made them look very bad compared to the President, and basically proved the point that Mark Schmitt, Andrew Sullivan, and others had been making about the “Obama Style”. Jonathan Chait notes:

Most of the Republicans have relied upon scripted talking points and generalized denunciations of big government and a “government takeover.” Numerous Democrats in the room have explained why it’s not possible to ban insurance companies from discriminating against those with preexisting conditions without also covering everybody and subsidizing those who afford it. (Short answer: people would just game the system, going without insurance until they get sick.) Obama has spoken at enormous length today about why letting insurance companies sell policies across state lines would let insurers siphon out the healthy and leave the sick behind.

John Boehner, the House Majority Leader, simply repeated the GOP talking point about scrapping the 2,000 page bill and doing the easy popular stuff: “Why can’t we agree on those insurance reforms we talked about? Why can’t we agree on purchasing across state lines?” It’s like he wasn’t even there. Does he not understand what the other side is saying? Does he not care at all? It’s not that he’s provided an answer to Obama’s arguments that I disagree with. He’s just totally unable to acknowledge or engage at any level with the arguments presented. You’re debating a brick wall.

The image problem was not limited to Congressional Republicans. Most Democrats in the room not named Barack Obama or Joe Biden came off pretty poorly too. That problem was due to the structure of the event, which basically never strayed from both parties throwing talking points and speeches at each other. The Democrats would have done much better if they had simply let the President do ALL of the talking for their party, because the grand exception to all of this was, of course, Obama. As Andrew Sullivan wrote, “can he have a cigarette now?” Ezra Klein makes the point best:

The people who came off best were those who knew the most about the issue. Paul Ryan and Tom Coburn on the Republican side. Dick Durbin and Chris Dodd for the Democrats. But above all of them, the president, who got to enter, adjudicate and conclude discussions at will — not to mention say when others didn’t know that much about the issue, or weren’t offering comments in good faith. That willingness to put himself above Congress, combined with the structure of the event, allowed Obama to fully dominate the proceedings, and he used the opportunity to firmly assert ownership over the health-care bill. This is now his legislation.

It is now his legislation. After all the talk about “Obamacare” the past year, there was never a White House health care plan. There were 5 bills (one for each committee the legislation had to go through), then there were two (the Senate’s and the House’s), and now, finally, there will be one. And it will be Obama’s to win or lose. He spent a year letting Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and Congress take the lead, a lesson from his background as a constitutional law professor as well as a lesson learned by Democrats from Bill Clinton’s failure to pass health care reform in 1993. Now it is his.

However, three days after this summit, I don’t feel like it did all that much. Obama was smart and was a good presider, the Congresspeople talked over each other, Republicans have no political reason to capitulate in any way, and Obama showed they have no ideas with the style that has become patented Obama. But he took control of this plan, and perhaps Congressional Democrats will take this event as a turning point towards passing a bill. Regardless, it was a fascinating look at how this President works.

And most importantly, we got tons of shots of the Obama Death Stare. See the photo above. And wither as your face melts off.

Update (3/1/2010):

Ezra Klein on the real purpose of the Health Care Summit:

The Blair House Summit had its purpose, but the major impact was distracting the media for three weeks while Democrats figured out what their next legislative step was going to be. Things like reading the plan aloud or wheeling cameras into the room while partisans make self-serving arguments about the worth of various proposals might serve some purpose, but that purpose isn’t informing people. Instead, it gives people the illusion of being informed, which might be better or might be worse, but is definitely different.

This tends to be the consensus a few days after the event. However, whatever practical purpose the Summit may have served, it was a fascinating look into the style of the President, who ran the discussion.

Because the Washington media loves those like Bayh who position themselves as bipartisan or centrist (especially when it comes to the issue of the deficit), progressives derided his so-called “centrism” as mere political positioning that helped Republicans obstruct Democratic initiatives, and met his exit with a flurry of blog posts with titles like “Bye, Bayh” or “Bayh Low” (“Bayh” is pronounced “Bye” or “Buy” – thus explaining my overly complicated attempt at a joke in my blog title). Ezra Klein called him an “ordinary politician” and a “minor deficit hypocrite”. Jonathan Chait goes farther, and notes that “If Bayh’s loss is a “brain drain,” then the Senate is in even worse shape than I thought.”

I once had the chance, along with numerous other reporters and editors, to speak with Bayh in an off-the-record context. I’d say the group was quite favorably disposed toward him going into the discussion — here was a young, popular, telegenic moderate Democrat everybody could see on a presidential ticket soon. As far as I could tell, everybody came away thoroughly unimpressed. He said nothing especially disagreeable, it was just that he seemed so mediocre. He expressed himself entirely in terms of platitudes. Not a single interesting thought escaped his lips.

He had no better luck appealing to the other side. The allure of centrism is that it is at the edge between the left-most Republicans and the right-most Democrats, and thus the deals are made and the power is held in the center. Bayh (and Max Baucus, and most Senate Democrats, and even President Obama) have learned the hard way that there is no reason to be centrist if the other side – even at its left-most reaches – refuses to do anything but obstruct. But Bayh wasn’t close to right-wing enough for any Republicans on any key issues, as Ross Douthat says:

His big issue was supposed to be deficit reduction, but you wouldn’t catch him dead proposing anything remotely like Paul Ryan’s fiscal roadmap, with its detailed list of programs to be reshaped and reduced.  (Bayh preferred the “bravery” of punting the issue to a commission.) On foreign policy, he was a liberal hawk on every vote except the hard ones: He backed the Iraq invasion in 2003 and takes a hard line on Iran today, but in the debate over the surge, when being hawkish was suddenly costly, he sided with the doves. Wherever the Beltway conventional wisdom settled, there was Evan Bayh — and he was rewarded for it with endless presidential and vice-presidential chatter, which has followed him, absurdly, even now that he’s announced his retirement.

The incredible thing, however, is what Bayh has done since announcing his retirement.  A two-faced politician of average intelligence to the left and too far left for todays right, Bayh has grabbed the issue of Senate disfunction with both hands. He penned an op-ed for the New York Times on Feb. 20th that outlined his reasons for leaving the Senate, and decrying the “institutional inertia gripping Congress” and the fact that “Congress must be reformed”. Its a remarkably thoughtful document (I would urge everyone to read it through), and one that (in addition to Bayh’s media tour since announcing his retirement) has brought the issue of Senate reform and filibuster reform into the Washington Conventional Wisdom (yes, the CW does need to be capitalized). Bayh’s most important ideas are these:

Filibusters should require 35 senators to sign a public petition and make a commitment to continually debate an issue in reality, not just in theory. Those who obstruct the Senate should pay a price in public notoriety and physical exhaustion. That would lead to a significant decline in frivolous filibusters.

Filibusters should also be limited to no more than one for any piece of legislation. Currently, the decision to begin debate on a bill can be filibustered, followed by another filibuster on each amendment, followed by yet another filibuster before a final vote. This leads to multiple legislative delays and effectively grinds the Senate to a halt.

What’s more, the number of votes needed to overcome a filibuster should be reduced to 55 from 60.

It is not so surprising that many of those voices decrying Bayh’s legislative record and subsequent retirement are now singing his praises. Matt Yglesias and Ezra Klein are the most prominent, with Klein bemoaning the fact that Bayh decided to make Senate reform an issue after he decided to leave the Senate instead of staying in the Senate to fight for those reforms. I’m not sure I agree. I believe the whole saga speaks to my personal view of the Senate, which is that those on the inside of the Senate are unable to see the dysfunctions that cripple the institution. Bayh is probably smarter than I gave him credit for before this weekend – I think his op-ed proves that – but something about being in the Senate, whether it was the constant campaign or the hunt for legislative power, hurt his ability to see the Senate as it really is. The moment he decided to leave the Senate he saw the dysfunction, and despite the jokes about his involvement in the dysfunction he insisted on using that as his reason for leaving. I don’t want you to stay in the Senate, Mr. Bayh. You’re much better off as a living, breathing example of why the Senate needs to reform itself.

What the Senate is not allowed to do, however, is tell future senators what rules must apply to their proceedings. Because Reichelderfer prohibits a previous Congress from tying the hands of a future Congress, the rules governing Senate procedure in 2010 cannot bind a newly elected Senate in 2011. The old Senate rules essentially cease to exist until the new Senate ratifies them, so a determined bloc of 51 senators could eliminate the filibuster altogether by demanding a rules change at the beginning of a new session. Once the new Senate begins to operate under the old rules, however, this can function as a ratification of the old rules — essentially locking those rules in place for another two years.

Millhiser is basically arguing that two Supreme Court decisions, Newton v. Commissioners in 1879 and Reichelderfer v. Quinn in 1932, make it possible for each new Senate to eliminate the filibuster, since the new Senate (the next one beginning in January 2011) isn’t beholden to any Senate procedures from previous Senates.

Practically, from the Democrats’ point of view, I do how this helps anything. First of all, Millhiser does not mention the procedures with which each new Senate, after swearing in any new members, ratifies the new rules that the body functions under. If the Senate begins to proceed without changing anything, then that acts as a ratification, but how procedurally difficult is it for 51 Senators to push through a new set of rules when a functioning Senate (oh my goodness what an oxymoron) is all that it takes to not eliminate the filibuster?

Secondly, I can’t imagine the Democrats having the political will or ability to do something like this next January. They are almost certain to lose seats in November, and due to the specific seats that are up for grabs this year the seats the Dems are most likely to lose aren’t the most conservative Democrats (for a good roundup of next November, check out Nate Silver’s analysis. His most recent update is here). Thus, while there may be 51 or 50 Senators in this Congress willing to eliminate the filibuster, the median Senator next January is most likely going to be too far to the right to want to mess with Senate procedures in a way that would benefit the Democrats.

Finally, I can only imagine that this sort of uprising, if it took place, would need the approval and cooperation of Majority Leader Harry Reid, who I cannot imagine approving of something like this. It tends to be the longest tenured Senators who are the most likely to defend arcane Senate procedures like the filibuster, and I doubt Reid is any different.

Basically, liberals have been frustrated by uniform Republican opposition and the super-majority requirement since President Obama took office, and this is the first I have heard of this proposal. It is a very interesting idea, but I can’t imagine that it is anything more than a very intriguing shot in the dark.

President Obama has nominated a variety of well-qualified officials to fill key posts in the Treasury Department, including positions with jurisdiction over tax policy and international finance. Their nominations would be approved if the Senate were allowed to vote on them.

But that’s not happening, because Senate Minority Whip Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) isn’t satisfied with — get this — enforcement of prohibitions on internet gambling. Kyl wanted enforcement in January, the administration said June, so Kyl effectively responded, “No Treasury Department officials for you.”

As Matt Yglesias points out, it might be a good idea to have an Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs or an Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, especially during a time of world-wide economic crisis. But one Senator who disagrees with a completely unrelated issue can leave one of the most important Departments short-handed just to make a point to the President.

This strikes me as part of a larger issue with the Senate – in a similar fashion to the filibuster. I can’t be the first to make this point, but there is enough ego in the Senate to power the world for years to come after we run out of oil. That’s too much. We need an alternative energy source. It’s not really anything to do with individuals, though some of them are especially egotistical. And I don’t think its necessarily a personal failure of any individual Senators, though certain Senators really don’t help matters much. The real problem is the institution of the Senate – its rules and its history. The rules give each individual Senator too much power and, more importantly, too much incentive to slow down progress, make outrageous demands, or kill bills whenever they want, and that leaves Senators with the need to do these things in order to get what they want, because if they don’t then someone else will and that Senator will be the one that needs to be given something in order to pass a bill. The Senate’s history and sense of tradition keep it from changing any of these rules to make it more efficient and in touch with the world of the 21st century (as opposed to the 19th). I mean, who actually believes that the Senate is actually the worlds “greatest deliberative body” except Senators? The House of Representatives has already passed the stimulus bill, health care reform, an energy bill, financial regulations, and a jobs bill in 2009. The Senate? Just the stimulus package and health care – and both by the slimmest of margins.

Back to Senate holds, this is not a partisan issue – though Republicans are the ones doing all the holding at the moment. This is an example of a Democratic Senator, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Michigan) holding up the confirmation of President Bush’s anti-terrorism nominations. Same situation, just as ridiculous.

It just follows the playbook that every minority party has followed since 1994: stop the majority from accomplishing anything so the public will become frustrated with the majority and vote for the minority in the next election. Forget the fact that the minority could get significant concessions that would legitimately advance their agenda from the majority if they played ball – they just want the P.R. victory that comes with the opposition failing. This favors the status quo and makes it impossible to fix some of the difficult issues that this country needs to deal with. So now a party need insanely big, once in a generation majorities in both chambers of Congress, plus the President to get anything done. And as Democrats have found in 2009 – it’s still very difficult. I blame the Senate for enabling this.